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DRAM SHOP LIABILITY IN BRIGANCE v.
VELVET DOVE RESTAURANT, INC.: A
LIMITED EVOLUTION TOWARD A
PROGRESSIVE RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the traditional common law, a cause of action against a tav-
ern owner for injuries to a third person caused by a consumer of alcohol
was generally unrecognized.' This rule of non-liability was based on a
theory that it was the voluntary consumption and not the sale of liquor
which was the proximate cause of any resulting injuries.2 Influenced by
the nationwide battle against drinking and driving,3 many states have
abrogated the traditional common law rule, and today many states recog-
nize that a vendor of alcoholic beverages may be liable to one injured by
an inebriate.4
The Oklahoma Supreme Court abrogated the traditional common
law rule of non-liability in Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc.5 The
court held that a commercial vendor has a duty, under both statutory
enactment and common law negligence principles, to exercise reasonable
care not to serve one noticeably intoxicated for on the premises consump-
1. Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725 P.2d 300, 302 (Okla. 1986). See also Cruse v.
Aden, 127 Il. 231, 234, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (1889) ("It was not a tort at common law to either sell or give
intoxicating liquor to 'a strong and able-bodied man.' "); Waller's Adm'r v. Collinsworth, 144 Ky. 3,
6, 137 S.W. 766, 767 (1911) ("[I]t cannot be said that he who sells the liquor that causes the intoxica-
tion . . . is therefore liable in damages for his wrongful act.").
2. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 302.
3. The tragic effects of drinking and driving seemed to influence the Brigance court. See infra
notes 54-57 and accompanying text. Anti-drunk driving groups such as Mothers Against Drunk
Driving (MADD) and Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID) have had a substantial effect on the in-
creased public awareness of the problems associated with drinking and driving. These organizations
estimate that every year more than 22,000 people are killed in alcohol-related motor vehicle acci-
dents and that at least 50 percent of all automobile accidents are alcohol related. What Young
Adults Should Know about Alcohol and Driving, MADD Release (1986); Telephone interview with
Ed Wheeler, President of Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID), Tulsa, Okla. Chapter (Oct. 22, 1986).
4. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 302.
5. Id. at 305-06.
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tion.6 When a vendor breaches its duty and there is a causal connection
between the sale and a foreseeable ensuing injury, civil liability will be
imposed.7 Thus, the holding provides a new civil claim for relief in
Oklahoma.
The Brigance court nevertheless failed to fully define the parameters
of commercial vendor liability and neglected to address several issues in-
cident to vendor liability. The court did not clearly establish the ven-
dor's civil liability to a third person injured by an illegally served minor
or address the liability of liquor store owners or social hosts. Moreover,
the Brigance opinion did not consider any of the usual defenses to negli-
gence. Based upon an analysis of the Brigance holding, either legislation
or further litigation is necessary to clarify the commercial vendor's duty
and possible defenses, and to define the liability of liquor store owners
and social hosts.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Shawn Brigance's high school post-prom festivities included a din-
ner at the Velvet Dove Restaurant. 8 The group of minors arrived at the
restaurant in an automobile driven by Jeff Johnson.9 During the celebra-
tion, the restaurant served intoxicating beverages to Johnson and the
others in the party, and although the group's minority was obvious from
their appearance, no inquiry was made as to Johnson's age."0 The alco-
hol which the restaurant served to Johnson either caused his intoxication
or increased his prior intoxication, and as the group left the restaurant, a
Velvet Dove employee assisted Johnson to his car." A one-car accident
resulted in which passenger Shawn Brigance was injured. 2
Brigance sued the Velvet Dove Restaurant alleging that the restau-
6. Id. Although the action was brought for negligence in serving alcoholic beverages to a
noticeably intoxicated person, the court also stressed that the restaurant illegally served a group of
minors. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
7. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 305 (citing Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983);
Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963)).
8. Reply Brief for Plaintiffs/Appellants at 11-12, Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc.,
725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986) (No. 62,005).
9. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 302.
10. Plaintiffs'/Appellants' Brief-in-Chief at 2, Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725
P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986) (No. 62,005).
11. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 302. The opinion implied that this factor imputed knowledge of
Johnson's intoxication to the defendant. Id. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text regarding
the court's analysis of the foreseeability factor required for vendor liability.
12. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 302.
[Vol. 22:351
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 22 [1986], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol22/iss3/3
DRAM SHOP LIABILITY
rant was negligent in serving alcoholic beverages to a noticeably intoxi-
cated person, thereby causing the accident which resulted in Brigance's
injuries.1 3 Having no Oklahoma dram shop legislation or precedent on
which to rely, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.14 Seeking a reversal of the
dismissal and a remand for trial on the merits, Brigance appealed to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court.15
B. Issue
The court narrowly stated the issue presented in Brigance: does a
third party passenger injured by an intoxicated driver have a civil cause
of action against a commercial vendor for the negligent sale of intoxicat-
ing beverages for on the premises consumption to a person the vendor
knew or should have known was intoxicated and whose consumption of
alcohol was the alleged cause of injuries.16 Relying on the modem trend
to recognize such liability and the dynamic nature of the common law,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that the
injured third party does have such a cause of action.1 7
III. BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Common Law
Under the traditional common law, a civil cause of action against a
liquor vendor for injuries to a third person resulting from the intoxica-
tion of a consumer was virtually unknown.'" The rule of non-liability
stemmed from the prevailing view that the voluntary consumption by the
intoxicated person and not the sale of the liquor was the proximate cause
of ensuing injuries."9 The sale was not considered negligent as a matter
of law and therefore commercial vendors escaped liability.
The modem trend in dram shop litigation illustrates a departure
13. Id. at 301.
14. Id. at 302. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2012(B)(6) (Supp. 1986).
15. Plaintiffs'/Appellants' Brief-in-Chief at 1, Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725
P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986) (No. 62,005).
16. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 302.
17. Id. The holding in Brigance was unanimous. C.J. Simms concurred, with V.C.J. Doolin
and J. Opala joining, by stating: in a suit brought by a consumer of alcohol against a vendor, the
rule of vendor non-liability is unchanged by the Brigance decision. Id. at 306. See infra note 112
and accompanying text (discussing the question of whether a consumer intoxicated driver has a
cause of action against a commercial vendor).
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from the traditional rule of non-liability. The retreat has been accom-
plished in many states by either legislation or judicial decision. Some
states have chosen to impose civil liability on vendors of alcohol through
what are commonly referred to as "dram shop acts."20 Typical dram
shop legislation mandates that commercial vendors who serve alcoholic
beverages to minors or intoxicated persons, thereby causing or increasing
their intoxication, will be held liable for injuries to a third person caused
by the inebriate. In other jurisdictions the conventional rule has been
changed by judicial decision.21 The courts generally base liability on
principles of negligence. Because the judiciary views the common law as
dynamic and amenable to change, courts have been able to reformulate
the traditional causation analysis to create a remedy for an injured third
party.
Oklahoma first addressed the issue of dram shop liability by legisla-
tion. The Oklahoma Legislature, however, has been virtually silent on
the subject since 1959. The Brigance case, therefore, presented an oppor-
tunity for the Oklahoma judiciary to rule on the issue of commercial
vendor liability.
20. Some degree of civil liability has been imposed in several states by dram shop legislation.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT,
ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1205 (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135
(Smith-Hurd 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1986); MIcH. COmp. LAWS ANN.
§ 436.22 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.801 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. GEN. Oau.
LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121 (1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 5-01-06 (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Baldwin 1984); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 30.950, 30.960 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 3-14-1 to -15 (Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 32A-14-1, 32A-14-2 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972).
21. Some states have imposed vendor liability through the courts. See, e.g., Waynick v. Chi-
cago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub norn. Saxner v. Waynick, 362
U.S. 903 (1960); Walker v. Griffith, 626 F. Supp. 350 (W.D. Va. 1986); Ontiveros v. Borak, 136
Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983); Kerby v. Flamingo Club, Inc., 35 Colo. App. 127, 532 P.2d 975
(1974); Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Ono v. Applegate, 62 Hawaii 131, 612
P.2d 533 (1980); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind.
598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968); Michnik-Zilberman v.
Gordon's Liquor, Inc., 390 Mass. 6, 453 N.E.2d 430 (1983); Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So. 2d
213 (Miss. 1979); Nehring v. LaCounte, - Mont. -, 712 P.2d 1329 (1986); Rappaport v. Nichols,
31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982); Campbell v.
Carpenter, 279 Or. 237, 566 P.2d 893 (1977); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa.
626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964); Callan v. O'Neil, 20 Wash. App. 32, 578 P.2d 890 (1978): Sorensen v.
Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo.
1983).
A few states with dram shop legislation have also recognized a common law right of action.
See, e.g., Crespin v. Largo Corp., 698 P.2d 836 (Colo. Ct. App.), affd, 727 P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1986):
Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); Hutchens v. Hankins, 63
N.C. App. 1,303 S.E.2d 584, review denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983); Mason v. Roberts,
33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973).
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B. Review of Oklahoma Dram Shop Law
In 1907, the Oklahoma legislature enacted a dram shop statute.22
By completely prohibiting intoxicants in Oklahoma, 3 the statute was
more than simple dram shop legislation. 4 In essence, strict liability was
imposed against anyone dealing with intoxicants; anyone injured by an
inebriate had a claim for relief against the liquor supplier.25 The days of
prohibition ended, however, and in 1959, Oklahoma vastly changed its
methods of liquor control.
With the passage of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act in 1959, the
Oklahoma Legislature repealed the prohibition and dram shop provi-
sions.26 Although it cannot be said that the dram shop act was selec-
tively repealed, the legislature did not enact any new provisions for dram
shop civil liability. 7 Therefore, parties injured by inebriates were left
without a statutory claim for relief against liquor vendors.
22. Prohibition Act, ch. 69, 1907-08 Okla. Sess. Laws 594, 610-11 (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit.
37, § 121 (repealed 1959)). OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 7 (repealed 1959) prohibited intoxicating liquors
in the former Indian territories and on Indian reservations but did not govern that part of the state
formerly known as Oklahoma Territory. The 1907 law extended prohibition to the entire state.
Bandy, Intoxicating Liquors in Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 37, Commentary - Liquor Laws,
3 (West 1951). The 1907 legislation provided for civil liability for causing the intoxication of a
tortfeasor:
Every wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other person who shall be injured in per-
son or property, or means of support by any intoxicated person or in consequence of intoxi-
cation of any person, shall have a right of action for all damages actually sustained, in his
or her own name against any person, individual or corporate, who shall, by selling, bar-
tering, giving away, or otherwise furnishing intoxicating liquors, contrary to the provisions
of this Act, have caused the intoxication of such person. On the trial of any such suit,
proof that the defendant, or defendants sold, bartered, gave away, or furnished any such
liquors to such intoxicated person on the day, or about the time (and prior thereto) of such
injury, shall be prima facie evidence that the liquor so sold, bartered, given away, or other-
wise furnished, caused such intoxication. In any action by a married woman, or other
person legally entitled to recover damages for loss of support, caused by such intoxication,
it shall only be necessary to prove that the defendant, or defendants, has or have given,
bartered, sold or otherwise furnished intoxicating liquor of any kind to such person, during
the period when such cause of action shall have accrued.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 121 (1951) (repealed 1959).
Editor's note - The Oklahoma Supreme Court appears to have been mistaken as to the date of the
dram shop act. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 302 (referring to 1910 enactment). While the law does appear
within the Rev. Laws of Okla. Ann., ch. 39, art. III, § 3629 (1910), itfirst appeared in the 1907-08
Okla. Sess. Laws. The provision was ratified and became effective on November 16, 1907. See
Bandy, supra at 3.
23. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellants at 7, Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725
P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986) (No. 62,005).
24. A typical dram shop act provides for comparatively limited liability. See, e.g.. R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 3-14-1 to -15 (Supp. 1986) (in contrast to Oklahoma's repealed dram shop legislation, this
dram shop act was not part of a comprehensive prohibition of intoxicating liquors).
25. Prohibition Act, ch. 69, 1907-08 Okla. Sess. Laws 594, 610-11 (codified at OKI.\. STAT. tit.
37, § 121 (repealed 1959)).
26. OKLA. STAr. tit. 37, § 501 (Supp. 1959).
27. The prohibition statutes were repealed as a whole in 1959. Thus, the legislature apparently
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In 1972, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals addressed the issue of ven-
dor liability in Snap v. London.28 The plaintiff in Snap alleged that she
was injured by an intoxicated customer while in defendant's tavern. 29 As
in Brigance, the plaintiff in Snap sued the defendant on common law
negligence grounds. 30 The trial court sustained the defendant's demur-
rer,31 but the court of appeals reversed with instructions to the lower
court to reinstate the cause of action and proceed by giving the plaintiff
the opportunity to prove causation.32
The court of appeals stated that a dram shop statute was not neces-
sary to impose liability because the tavern keeper's liability was depen-
did not decide to abrogate specifically the rule of vendor liability. See infra notes 49-53 and accom-
panying text.
Perhaps the Oklahoma legislature did not retain a dram shop statute because the 1907 statute
was never judicially used to impose dram shop civil liability. See Snap v. London, 43 OKLA. B.J. 959
(Okla. Ct. App. 1972) (an unofficial decision stating that vendor liability was an open question in
Oklahoma because the Oklahoma Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the issue before or
since the repeal of the 1907 statute). Id. at 960.
28. Snap, 43 OKLA. B.J. 959 (Okla. Ct. App. 1972). The Snap opinion presents many interest-
ing points not present in Brigance. First, although the Snap court did not state how the plaintiff's
injuries occured, it is arguable that the were not caused by a drunk-driving accident. Thus, perhaps
any personal injury caused by an inebriate may be attributed to the commercial vendor. See, e.g.,
Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wash. 2d 911, 541 P.2d 365 (1975) (action to recover damages for accidental
shooting of the plaintiff's husband by an inebriate on defendant's premises).
Second, instead of discussing proximate causation as the court did in Brigance, 725 P.2d at 305,
the Snap court stated the causation issue in terms of multiple causation. Snap, 43 OKLA. B.J. at 960.
The Brigance decision is much more progressive in that the Brigance court apparently considered the
vendor's actions to be the sole legal cause of a plaintiff's injuries. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 305. See
infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. Instead of applying multiple causation to the patron's
voluntary consumption along with the vendor's sale as was done in Snap, the issue of multiple causa-
tion should apply only to a case involving joint tortfeasors. Other jurisdictions recognize that more
than one tavern owner may be held liable for a single plaintiff's injuries. See, e.g., Trail v. Village of
Elk River, 286 Minn. 380, -, 175 N.W.2d 916, 921 (1970) (nothing precluded the plaintiff from
suing three state liquor stores for damages except meeting the requisite causation elements under a
civil damage act). This notion is suggested in Brigance where the court discussed the vendor's duty
to recognize a consumer's "prior intoxication." Brigance, 725 P.2d at 304.
Snap also varied from Brigance because the beverage served to the intoxicated customer in Snap
was only 3.2 beer and not intoxicating liquor. Snap, 43 OKLA. B.J. at 961. Importantly, 3.2. beer is
statutorily defined as non-intoxicating. See infra note 42. The Snap court noted that 3.2 beer had
been held to be intoxicating for criminal purposes even though it is non-intoxicating for licensing and
taxing purposes. Snap, 43 OKLA. B.J. at 961 (citing Ashcraft v. State, 68 Okla. Crim. 308, 315, 98
P.2d 60, 64 (1940)). Even though it was not a statutory violation to sell 3.2 beer to an intoxicated
person, the court determined that the absence of such a statute was of no significance except that it
eliminated any claim of negligence per se. Id. For a discussion of negligence per se see infra note 61.
Perhaps this reasoning may be used in a similar future case with Brigance as support. However, a
sale to minors would be a statutory violation because it is unlawful in Oklahoma to sell 3.2 beer to
those under twenty-one years of age. See infra note 92.
29. Snap, 43 OKI.A. B.J. at 960.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 962.
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dent upon common law negligence principles.3 3 The court considered
that the risks caused by one's intoxication were considered to be well
known and easily foreseeable to a tavern keeper.34 The vendor therefore
had a duty of care in dealing with intoxicated individuals.35 Although
the opinion in Snap v. London has no precedential value in Oklahoma,3 6
the case did represent the first time that the Oklahoma courts addressed
the issue of vendor liability either prior to or after the repeal of the dram
shop act of 1907. 37
C. Recent Legislative Effort
In 1985, the Oklahoma legislature attempted to enact new dram
shop legislation.38 The attempt failed, however, because the bill was de-
feated in committee. 39 The legislation was very broad because, as pro-
posed, a claim for relief was available to any person injured in any
manner as a result of another's intoxication.4 According to the bill, the
33. Id. at 961. The opinion suggests that even if there were a dram shop act it would have had
little significance on the Snap holding because dram shop acts do not preclude liability on principles
of negligence but only deal with strict liability. Id. For a listing of some of the jurisdictions that
have imposed vendor liability on common law negligence grounds despite the presence of dram shop
legislation, see supra note 21.
34. Snap, 43 OKLA. B.J. at 960. The risks of injury to both a third party and an intoxicated
consumer were considered to be foreseeable to the tavern keeper. Even so, a cause of action against
the vendor by the consumer was not considered by the Brigance court. See infra note 112 and
accompanying text.
35. Snap, 43 OKLA. B.J. at 961-62.
36. OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 30.5 (1981). The statute confers only limited authority to the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals. Civil cases are assigned to the court of appeals by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court but no opinions are binding or cited as precedent unless approved for publication by
a majority of the justices of the supreme court. Id.
37. Snap, 43 OKLA. B.J. at 960.
38. S. 116, 40th Leg., 1st Sess. (1985). The proposed legislation was introduced to impose civil
liability as follows:
A. Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of support, or otherwise
by an intoxicated person, or by reason of the intoxication of any person, whether resulting
in his death or not, shall have a right of action against any person who shall, by selling to,
serving, or unlawfully assisting in procuring any alcoholic beverage or non-intoxicating
beverage, as defined in this title, for such intoxicated person, have caused or contributed to
such intoxication; and in any such action such person shall have a right to recover actual
and exemplary damages.
B. In case of the death of either party, the action or right of action given by this section
shall survive to or against his or her executor, administrator, or personal representative.
and the amount so recovered by a husband, wife or child shall be his or her sole and
separate property.
C. No person who has gratuitously provided alcoholic beverages to a guest in a social
setting may be held liable to any person for bodily injury, death or property damage arising
from the intoxication of the social guest.
Id.
39. Telephone interview with Senator Jerry Smith (Aug. 10, 1986) (Senator Smith introduced
the 1985 proposed dram shop statute to the Oklahoma legislature).
40. S. 116, 40th Leg. Ist Sess. (1985).
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injured party could recover actual and exemplary damages from any per-
son, other than a social host,4 who caused or contributed to the intoxica-
tion by selling, serving, or unlawfully assisting in procuring alcoholic or
non-intoxicating beverages. a2 In addition, if the injuries resulted in death,
the proposed legislation specifically provided for a wrongful death cause
of action.4 3 The Oklahoma legislature, however, failed to enact the sug-
gested statute which would have once again imposed civil liability upon
commercial vendors of alcoholic beverages. The judiciary, therefore, was
free to address the issue of vendor civil liability in Oklahoma.
IV. THE COURT'S HOLDING
In Brigance the Oklahoma Supreme Court abrogated the conven-
tional common law rule of non-liability." Concluding that liquor ven-
dors may be subject to civil liability when a third person is injured by the
impaired driving of a negligently served patron, the court addressed the
scope of vendor liability.
In light of early legislative involvement in the area of dram shop
liability, the court was faced with the task of establishing its authority to
address and rule on the issue." The appellee in Brigance claimed that
the power to change the common law lay only in the province of the
legislature, and that the judiciary, therefore, lacked authority to impose
liability.46 By rejecting appellee's argument, the court implicitly deter-
41. The proposed legislation received so much opposition within the Oklahoma legislature that
social host liability was excluded in hopes of an increased chance in getting the legislation passed.
Telephone interview with Senator Jerry Smith (Sept. 17, 1986). The adamant opposition to any rule
of this type of civil liability may be some indication that the Oklahoma legislature will attempt to
limit the effects of Brigance. See infra note 48.
42. S. 116, 40th Leg., 1st Sess. (1985). The provision was made for both alcoholic and non-
intoxicating beverages in an attempt to impose liability for statutory violations on purveyors of 3.2
beer as well as suppliers of intoxicating liquors. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 163.2(a) (1981) (defining
beverages with less than 3.2 percent alcohol by weight as non-intoxicating). Under the proposed
legislation, liability could have conceivably attached to owners or employees of convenience stores,
grocery stores, etc., that provided 3.2 beer to an inebriate, as well as to tavern and liquor store
owners. Telephone interview with Senator Jerry Smith (Aug. 10, 1986).
43. S. 116, 40th Leg., 1st Sess. (1985).
44. Brigance, 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986).
45. Id. at 303.
46. Id. Defendants/Appellees' Response Brief at 7, Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc.,
725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986) (No. 62,005).
Perhaps the appellee was relying on a constitutional separation of powers principle: where the
legislature has the authority to rule in an area, the judiciary may not infringe on its powers. OKLA,
CONSr. art. IV, § I. The argument seems to be that imposing vendor liability is in the interest of
public safety which falls within the legislature's police powers. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 601 P,2d 117
(Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (stating that the legislature has the power to determine what is dangerous
or injurious to the public health, morals, or safety). However, the Oklahoma courts do not always
accede to this view. See, e.g, Ford v. Board of Tax-Roll Collections, 431 P.2d 423, 427-30 (Okla,
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mined that because the rule of non-liability was created by common law
which is inherently dynamic in nature, the judiciary has the power to
modify its rules to adapt to the changing conditions of society.47 Decid-
ing that tort law development was peculiarly a judicial function, the
court reemphasized its view that when a judicially recognized doctrine is
no longer supportable in reason, in justice, or in light of the overwhelm-
ing trend against its recognition, the judiciary and not the legislature has
the duty to abrogate the rule.4"
In stating that it was proper for the judiciary to address the issue of
dram shop liability, the Brigance court took a critical look at the legisla-
ture's inaction since the 1959 repeal of Oklahoma's dram shop act.49 De-
termining that the failure to enact new dram shop legislation was not an
affirmative decision by the Oklahoma legislature to allow liquor vendors
to escape liability for their negligent actions, the court reasoned that the
legislature did not selectively repeal the dram shop statute." The act
was merely a component of the former prohibition ordinance which was
entirely abrogated when the statute was repealed in Oklahoma in 1959.51
The court concluded that statutory silence did not unequivocally demon-
strate legislative intent,"z dismissed the issue by refusing to indulge in a
psychoanalysis of legislative motive, and turned to what the court saw as
the important societal need for a new rule of vendor liability. 3
1967) (stating that while the police power is generally considered an exclusive power of the legisla-
ture, it may be exercised by the courts). For a further discussion of the tension between the legisla-
ture and the judiciary, see infra note 48.
47. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 303-04.
48. Id. (referring to Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Okla. 1983) where the
Oklahoma Supreme Court modified the common law doctrine of governmental immunity).
Perhaps by this reasoning the court was setting the stage for future legislative input in the area
of dram shop liability. If the legislature enacts a dram shop law that attempts to limit the effects of
Brigance, the Oklahoma judiciary may be faced with a constitutional struggle if it wants to take the
concept of vendor liability any further than Brigance. The courts could use the common lav as its
arsenal to determine that the judiciary has the authority to decide the issue without deference to the
legislature. However, the separation of powers principle enunciated in OKLA. CONsT. art. IV, § 1
may create a problem. See, e.g., Champlin Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 25 F. Supp. 218, 220
(W.D. Okla. 1938) (stating that it is the duty of the courts to give effect to legislative acts, not to
amend, repeal, or circumvent them); Allgood v. Allgood, 626 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Okla. 1981) (a court
may not ignore the plain words of a statute).
49. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 303.
50. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. If the legislature had wanted to specifically
abrogate the rule of vendor liability, presumably it would have enacted "reverse" dram shop legisla-
tion. "Reverse" dram shop acts typically provide that individuals such as tavern owners or social
hosts will not be held civilly liable for injuries to a third person caused by an inebriate.
51. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 303. For a discussion of the 1907 dram shop act, see supra note 22.
52. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 303. This view is in accord with the federal court's interpretation of
congressional silence. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (illustrating the view that legislative
silence does not always reflect legislative intent).
53. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 303-04.
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The frequency of drunk driving accidents and ensuing bodily inju-
ries54 affected the Brigance decision. The court noted that in the "horse
and buggy" days the common law of torts was not significantly affected
by the sale of liquor to an intoxicated person." The current use of
automobiles, however, dictated the need to modify the common law be-
cause, in the words of Justice Hughes, steel and speed become "a lethal
weapon in the hands of a drunken imbiber." 56 The rule of non-liability
was considered unrealistic, inconsistent with modern tort theories, and a
complete anachronism in today's society.57 Conceivably, if vendors exer-
cise due care in serving intoxicating liquors, they should be able to help
curb the effects of drinking and driving. Although a rule of civil liability
may only marginally affect the drinking and driving statistics, any deter-
rent is likely to be welcomed by a society that has become greatly con-
cerned about the tragedies caused by intoxicated drivers. 8
The Brigance court found the duty of the commercial vendor in or-
dinary common law negligence principles and statutory mandate.5 9 The
elements of common law negligence were summarized as duty, breach,
causation, and damages.6 Thus, a plaintiff is required to prove each ele-
ment of negligence before liability can be imposed under the Brigance
decision.
According to Brigance, both common law negligence principles and
statutory enactment dictate the commercial vendor's duty.6 The court
54. Id. at 304. See supra note 3 (drunk-driving statistics).
55. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 304.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Seesupra note 3. As part of its effort to increase awareness of the problems associated with
drinking and driving, Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID) works with owners and employees of bars
and taverns, so the overall impact may prove to be more than marginal in the long-run. Telephone
interview Ed Wheeler, President of RID, Tulsa, Okla. Chapter (Oct. 22, 1986).
59. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 304. See infra note 61 (discussion of negligence per se principles in
relation to the Oklahoma statute addressing the furnishing of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated
person).
60. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 302.
61. Under OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 537(A)(2) (Supp. 1986) it is illegal to serve alcohol to an
intoxicated person. The court noted the statutory violation in its holding but did not delve into a
negligence per se analysis. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 304 & n.7. If a party violates a statute or ordi-
nance which imposes only criminal liability, the violation also can be used to inflict civil liability. A
statute or ordinance is logically considered to impose a duty upon a person to act in a manner that
complies with the law so the violation may be defined as evidence of negligence for civil liability
purposes. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 36 (5th ed. 1984). See
also Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980) (violation of mechanical code
ordinance found to be negligence per se).
There are several possible reasons why the court failed to fully address the statutory violations.
The court might have wanted to reassert its authority to rule on the issue of vendor liability without
giving deference to the legislature. Or perhaps the court did not use a theory of negligence per se in
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noted the statutory violation in serving liquor to one noticeably intoxi-
cated and then focused on common law negligence concepts.6 2 Gener-
ally, if circumstances demonstrate that it is reasonable to expect that
one's actions will result in an unreasonable risk of harm to others, the
actor then has a legal duty to behave in a reasonable manner. 63 In apply-
ing this general proposition, the Brigance court stated that the commer-
cial vendor has a duty to exercise reasonable care not to sell or furnish
liquor to a noticeably intoxicated person in anticipation that the patron's
impaired driving ability could cause injury to others. 64 Based upon the
facts and circumstances presented in Brigance, the foreseeable occur-
rence of injury to the plaintiff as a result of the driver's impaired ability
to operate an automobile imposed a duty upon the vendor to act reason-
ably, and the failure to do so constituted a breach of duty.6" Although
the facts easily suggested findings of duty and breach, the causation ele-
ment of negligence presented a more complicated issue to the Brigance
court.
To establish vendor liability, the court had to find that the vendor's
breach of duty proximately resulted in the plaintiff's injuries.6 6 By hold-
ing that the breach proximately caused the injury, the court effectively
abrogated the traditional rule of non-liability which provided that the
consumption and not the sale of liquor was the proximate cause of ensu-
ing injuries .6' By demonstrating that the intoxicated person's consump-
tion of liquor was not a supervening cause, the court established that the
commercial vendor's breach of duty was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries. 68 Because the consumption was considered a foresee-
able consequence of the sale, the chain of legal causation between the
Brigance, because it feared that relying on a legislative enactment to impose liability would bind it to
any future legislation on dram shop liability. Or maybe the court was broadening the way for future
litigation because the facts before it were so narrow.
Several jurisdictions have imposed civil liability on liquor suppliers on a negligence per se the-
ory. See, ag., Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217
N.E.2d 847 (1966); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968); Chausse v. Southland Corp., 400 So.
2d 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982); Davis v. Billy's
Con-Teena, Inc., 284 Or. 351, 587 P.2d 75 (1978); Callan v. O'Neil, 20 Wash. App. 32, 578 P.2d 890
(1978).
62. Brigance,725 P.2d at 304 & n.7.
63. Id. at 304.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 305.
67. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
68. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 305. The court defined a supervening cause as an intervening cause
that breaks the causal nexis between the negligent sale of liquor and the plaintiff's injury. Id. The
test to determine whether a cause is supervening is whether it is "(1) independent of the original act,
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negligent sale and the resulting injuries was not broken, and the vendor
could be held civilly liable to the injured plaintiff.69 Under the Brigance
causation analysis a plaintiff must prove that the "illegal sale of alcohol
led to the impairment of the ability of the driver which was. . . a causal
connection between the sale and a foreseeable ensuing injury."7
By adopting a rule of liability, the Oklahoma Supreme Court cre-
ated a new civil cause of action.71 The court determined that "public
policy is better served by holding that the common law principles of neg-
ligence are applicable where a commercial vendor for on the premises
consumption is shown to have sold or furnished intoxicating beverages to
a person who was noticeably intoxicated."72 The rule of liability adopted
in Brigance was applied to the parties in the case and is to be applied
prospectively to similar causes of action.73 Although the Brigance deci-
sion creates a new cause of action in Oklahoma, several issues incident to
vendor liability remain unresolved.
V. ANALYSIS
Brigance came before the Oklahoma Supreme Court at a time when
the issue of dram shop liability was particularly significant because of the
frequency of drunk-driving accidents and ensuing bodily injuries to an
unsuspecting public.74 The Oklahoma legislature failed to enact any new
laws in the area despite the fact that a majority of jurisdictions either
enacted dram shop acts or judicially imposed civil liability on vendors of
intoxicating beverages.75 Given these facts and the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's view that it had the power to act on the issue,76 the imposition of
a new rule of vendor liability is not surprising. The court's holding is
(2) adequate of itself to bring about the result and (3) one whose occurrence was not reasonably
foreseeable." Id.; e.g., Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp., Inc., 652 P.2d 260, 264 (Okla. 1982).
The Brigance court ultimately determined that an inebriate's consumption of liquor following a
negligent sale did not constitute a supervening cause. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 305. In making this
determination the court focused primarily upon the foreseeability factor of the supervening cause
test. The car accident caused by the drunk driver was considered a foreseeable consequence of the
negligent sale of liquor. Id.
69. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 305.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 306.
72. Id. at 305.
73. Id. at 306. The issue is now how far the judiciary will be able to expand the Brigance
decision. For a discussion of a few of the unresolved issues, see infra text accompanying notes 77-
105.
74. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 304. See supra note 3.
75. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text; notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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extremely narrow, however, and will ultimately force injured plaintiffs to
litigate issues left unresolved by the decision unless the legislature steps
in and clearly defines the parameters of the new rule of civil liability.
A. Unresolved Issues
Because the court was limited by the facts before it, questions re-
main. Among the obvious unresolved issues are questions about the
scope of the vendor's duty, civil liability based on illegal sales to minors,
liability of liquor store owners, social host liability, and the usual de-
fenses of assumption of risk and comparative negligence.
1. Scope of the Commercial Vendor's Duty
The holding in Brigance does not clearly explain the common law
duty of a commercial vendor. Does the vendor have a duty not to serve a
noticeably intoxicated patron, or is the vendor allowed to serve but to
exercise reasonable care in doing so? The court twice stated the vendor's
duty explicitly, but used materially different language in both instances."7
While it may only be a matter of semantics for purposes of determining
that the Brigance court held that a vendor may be civilly liable to a third
person injured by an inebriate, the variation in language presents a prob-
lem in establishing what exactly the commercial vendor's duty entails. If
faced with a civil liability claim, it would be difficult under Brigance for a
vendor to assert that he exercised reasonable care in serving the one who
injured the plaintiff, because the supreme court failed to establish any
guidelines for defining the vendor's standard of care. In examining the
court's failure to define a standard of care and the Oklahoma criminal
statute addressing the issue of serving intoxicating beverages, Brigance
should be read as holding that the commercial vendor has a duty not to
serve alcoholic beverages to a noticeably intoxicated person when the
vendor can reasonably foresee the unreasonable risk of harm to others as
a result of the inebriate's impaired ability to operate an automobile.
The commercial vendor may not be protected from civil liability by
exercising reasonable care in serving one noticeably intoxicated 8 because
77. For instance, in concluding that the judiciary had the authority to modify the common law,
the court stated: "[Wie, thus, hold that one who sells intoxicating beverages for on the premises
consumption has a duty to exercise reasonable care not to sell liquor to a noticeably intoxicated
person." Brigance, 725 P.2d at 304 (emphasis added). Whereas, in analyzing duty, the court held
that "the commercial vendor for on the premises consumption is under a duty... to exercise reason-
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the court did not define what constitutes a standard of reasonable care.
The court's failure to establish guidelines by which a commercial vendor
is to conduct himself when dealing with intoxicated customers suggests
that when a third party is injured by an inebriate, hindsight will always
dictate that reasonable care in serving was not exercised. At first blush,
this analysis may appear to be ignoring the elements of negligence and
suggesting a strict liability standard. However, the negligence theory is
still intact, because although the court basically ignored the vendor's
standard of care, it did focus on what the vendor must foresee in order to
escape civil liability.79 Foreseeability is an element of negligence causa-
tion, and the vendor's duty under Brigance is to foresee the unreasonable
risk of harm to others." Thus, if a vendor recognizes that a patron is
intoxicated,"' the vendor should reasonably assume that the customer
will rely on an automobile for transportation which will cause potential
danger to others. Thus, the vendor should refuse to serve intoxicating
beverages to an intoxicated patron. If the plaintiff cannot prove that the
vendor served the patron while the customer was noticeably intoxicated,
the vendor should escape liability under Brigance. 2
Additional support for the proposition that a commercial vendor
should exercise reasonable care not to serve one noticeably intoxicated is
found in statutory authority. The Oklahoma statute that imposes crimi-
nal liability on persons who serve liquor to intoxicated persons was a
basis for imposing civil liability on the vendor in Brigance. 3 A vendor
has a duty to act in compliance with the statute and serving one notice-
ably intoxicated was a violation implicitly found by the court to be negli-
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Not only did the court fail to clearly define the vendor's standard of care, it also failed to set
forth guidelines to ascertain whether a patron's intoxication meets the standard of "noticeably intox-
icated."
See Kyle v. State, 366 P.2d 961, 965-66 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961), where the court defined the
standard for determining whether one is intoxicated within the meaning of the liquor control statute.
A seller is guilty of selling alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person when the one to whom the
sale was made was "so far under the influence of intoxicants that his conduct and demeanor were not
up to standard" which is "reasonably discernible to a person of ordinary experience." A seller can-
not repudiate responsibility by failing to observe or by ignoring the patron's intoxicated state. Id.
There are a variety of standards used in other jurisdictions for ascertaining whether one is intoxi-
cated. See Note, Dram Shop Civil Liability in Arizona-Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz 500, 667 P.2d
200 (1983); Brannigan v. Raybuck, 136 Ariz 513, 667 P.2d 213 (1983), 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369, 382-
84, for a discussion of some of the usual criteria.
82. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 306. It is assumed that proving that a customer was noticeably intox-
icated at the time of the illegal sale is plaintiff's burden along with the other elements of the negli-
gence claim.
83. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 537(A)(2) (Supp. 1986); Brigance, 725 P.2d at 304.
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gence as a matter of law.84 Thus, a vendor should be aware that the
refusal to serve liquor to a noticeably intoxicated person is wiser than
attempting to comply with an equivocal "duty to exercise reasonable care
in serving one noticeably intoxicated."85 In addition to the failure to
clearly establish the vendor's standard of care when dealing with intoxi-
cated persons, the Brigance court failed to analyze the vendor's potential
civil liability to a third person injured by an illegally served minor.
2. Civil Liability for Illegal Sales to Minors
Although suggested by the facts, the Brigance court did not specifi-
cally rule on the issue of a vendor's civil liability to a third person injured
by the impaired driving of an illegally served minor.86 The issue before
the court was the negligent sale of intoxicating beverages to an intoxi-
cated person, but the court specifically noted that the negligently served
person was also a minor.87 Moreover, when the court discussed the sale
as a statutory violation, it cited the provision that prohibits the sale of
liquor to minors along with the provision that prohibits the sale to intoxi-
cated persons. 88 Thus, the court could have further defined the vendor's
duty by explicitly recognizing that civil liability to third persons injured
by illegally served minors may be imposed. Several jurisdictions have
held vendors civilly liable for negligent sales to minors89 on either a negli-
gence per se or common law negligence theory. 90
Legislation prohibiting the sale of alcohol to minors often has an
underlying public policy goal to protect minors.9 1 With public policy in
84. Supra note 61 and accompanying text.
85. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 304.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 302.
88. Id. at 304 & n.7.
89. See, eg., Morris v. Farley Enter., 661 P.2d 167 (Alaska 1983); Brannigan v. Raybuck, 136
Ariz. 513, 667 P.2d 213 (1983); Migliore v. Crown Liquors, 448 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1984); Alegria v.
Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966);
Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968); Chausse v.
Southland Corp., 400 So. 2d 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor, Inc.,
390 Mass. 6, 453 N.E.2d 430 (1983); Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1979); Nesbitt
v. Westport Square, Ltd., 624 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188,
156 A.2d 1 (1959); Porter v. Ortiz, 100 N.M. 58, 665 P.2d 1149 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Davis v.
Billy's Con-Teena, Inc., 284 Or. 351, 587 P.2d 75 (1978); Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441
(1963); Smith v. Evans, 421 Pa. 247, 219 A.2d 310 (1966); Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350
N.W.2d 108 (1984); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
Usually there is no requirement that the minor be noticeably intoxicated before liability can be
imposed. See, e.g., Brannigan, 136 Ariz. 513, -, 667 P.2d 213, 216 (where the court discussed the
foreseeable hazard as the minor becoming drunk and injuring himself or others).
90. For a discussion of negligence per se, see supra note 61.
91. See, e.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959) (landmark case in the area
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mind, courts consider it especially reprehensible to sell intoxicating li-
quor to minors.92 When a sale ultimately results in injury to a third
party, the courts are quick to place the blame on the liquor vendor and
find negligence as a matter of law. 93
A liquor vendor can also be held civilly liable for selling liquor to a
minor on ordinary negligence grounds, because the vendor should rea-
sonably foresee that minors may cause harm to others if they are intoxi-
cated.9 4 Because minors are often considered too immature and
inexperienced to be held completely accountable for some of their ac-
tions, it is considered foreseeable that a minor may act negligently if en-
trusted with certain instrumentalities.95 It follows that when a minor
who intends to operate a motor vehicle is served intoxicating beverages,
the unreasonable risk of danger to the public is foreseeable. 96 Therefore,
a duty to take precautions and to protect others from the minor's inexpe-
rience, which is dangerously heightened by alcohol, can easily be as-
signed to the commercial vendor of intoxicating beverages.
In addition to its holding, the Brigance court could have explicitly
recognized that a vendor may be civilly liable to a third person injured by
an illegally served minor. The relevant facts were before the court and
Oklahoma law has already clearly imposed a duty upon liquor licensees
when dealing with minors.97 Liability could have been imposed through
a finding of either negligenceper se or ordinary negligence. Not only did
the Brigance court fail to clearly establish the commercial vendor's stan-
dard of care when dealing with either intoxicated persons or with minors,
of vendor civil liability for the negligent sale of intoxicating beverages to a minor. Many jurisdic-
tions which recognize a civil right of action against a liquor vendor do so on the theory enunciated in
Rappaport). Brigance, 725 P.2d at 302-03.
92. Id.
93. Morris v. Farley Enter., 661 P.2d 167 (Alaska 1983); Davis v. Billy's Con-Teena, Inc., 284
Or. 351, 587 P.2d 75 (1978); Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 655, 663 P.2d 834 (1983).
94. Minors are thought to react more violently to the effects of alcohol than are adults. Tele-
phone interview with Ed Wheeler, President of RID, Tulsa, Okla. Chapter (Oct. 22, 1986). The
extreme reactions combined with a lack of maturity and awareness of the effects of alcohol create a
danger for others. Id.
95. See, e-g., Vance v. Thomas, 716 P.2d 710 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986) (plaintiff who was shot in
the eye with a BB gun had a claim for relief on a negligence theory against the parent of the child
handling the gun).
96. Brannigan v. Raybuck, 136 Ariz. 513, -, 667 P.2d 213, 216 (1983). The court also men-
tioned the unreasonable risk that the minor may injure himself. Id.
97. A vendor has the responsibility to determine the age of a customer, and where facts, cir-
cumstances, or appearances offer the slightest indicia of suspicion, a licensee is required to make a
deliberate effort to ascertain the age of the patron before any sale is consumated. Oklahoma Alco-
holic Bev. Control Bd. v. Moss, 509 P.2d 666, 668-69 (Okla. 1973). If there is any doubt about the
customer's age, the sale of alcoholic beverages must be refused. Thus, a vendor may not repudiate
his duty by ignoring the obvious. Id.
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the Oklahoma Supreme Court also failed to indicate what position it will
take if future claims of liquor store owner liability or social host liability
come before the court.
3. Liability of Liquor Store Owners
Although the Brigance court focused on commercial vendors for on
the premises consumption, liquor store owners may also be held liable
under the same principles that govern tavern owner liability. Both are
classified as licensees under the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control
Act.9" A duty derived from the Oklahoma liquor control laws thus may
apply to liquor store owners as well as to tavern owners.
While it may be argued that injury to a third person is less foresee-
able to a liquor store clerk because the alcohol is less likely to be con-
sumed on the premises, 99 a sale to an intoxicated person or a minor
would nevertheless constitute a statutory violation."°° Therefore, a li-
quor store owner may be found negligent as a matter of law.101 Because
Brigance, however, focused on the concept of foreseeability for both duty
and causation, it may be more difficult to prove the requisite causal con-
nection between the sale and the ensuing injuries. °2 Accordingly, Bri-
gance can be used as a foundation for liquor store owner liability; but
until there is further litigation or legislation on the issue, a petition seek-
ing recognition of such liability should be supplemented with negligence
per se as an alternative method of recovery.
4. Social Host Liability
The Oklahoma Supreme Court specifically stated that it did not ad-
dress the issue of social host civil liability in the Brigance opinion.10 3 In
98. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 506(12) (Supp. 1986). See also Note, supra note 81 at 385 (introduc-
ing the notion that liquor store owners could be held liable under the same principles that govern
tavern owner liability due to their licensee status in the law).
99. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 534(B) (Supp. 1986) (package store licensees may only sell alcoholic
beverages for consumption off the premises).
100. OKIA. STAT. tit 37, § 537(A)(1)(2) (Supp. 1986). Under this analysis a purveyor of 3.2 beer
could also be held liable for an illegal sale to a minor. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 241 (Supp. 1986).
101. A statutory violation as evidence of negligence is discused supra note 61. See also Note,
supra note 81, at 384-85 (suggesting that such sales would be negligence per se).
102. See Note, supra note 81, at 385 (discussing the difficulties in proving the requisite causal
connection). Because the court restricted the holding to sales for on the premises consumption, this
may be some indication that the court would consider injury caused by an illegal sale for off the
premises consumption less foreseeable. However, if an injured plaintiff can prove that the sale was
made to a noticeably intoxicated person, the foreseeability factor of the Brigance analysis may be
met.
103. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 306 n.12.
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fact, nothing in the holding indicates that the court even considered the
possibility of recognizing social host liability, because the court expressly
limited its holding to the issue of commercial vendor liability for on the
premises consumption.
By examining the court's analysis, however, some of the same fac-
tors that were applied to commercial vendors may also be applied to so-
cial hosts. The court spoke of liability primarily in terms of the
foreseeability factor. Thus, under the appropriate circumstances, a social
host may be expected to foresee the unreasonable risk of harm to others
caused by furnishing liquor to a minor or to an intoxicated person. In
fact, a social host may be more likely to have knowledge of one's intoxi-
cation or minority; so in terms of foreseeability, social host liability may
not be precluded in future litigation despite the narrow holding in
Brigance.10
4
The civil liability of social hosts finds even more support in
Oklahoma's liquor control laws. The same statute relied upon by the
Brigance court to impose vendor liability could also be used to impose
social host liability. The law provides that no person shall knowingly sell,
deliver, or furnish alcoholic beverages to any person under twenty-one
years of age or to an intoxicated person. 10 This broad language suggests
that social host liability may be recognized as a matter of law. Thus, if
the foreseeability element used in Brigance and negligence shown by stat-
utory violation are combined, social host liability in Oklahoma may be
recognized in the future. Furthermore, in light of the nationwide cam-
paign against drinking and driving, the imposition of social host liability
may be considered to be in the public interest unless Oklahoma precludes
its recognition by specific legislation or further litigation.
B. Defenses
The defendant in Brigance did not assert any of the usual defenses to
negligence; instead, the defendant relied on the traditional rule of non-
liability and simply claimed that the court was not free to change the
rule. 06 In light of the trend to recognize vendor civil liability, the tavern
104. Recall that the Oklahoma legislature sought to enact a dram shop statute in 1985 which
while providing some civil remedies, specifically precluded social host liability. See supra note 38
and accompanying text. The implication is that if the legislature attempts to limit the Brigance
holding by statute, recovery from social hosts may be expressly denied.
105. OKLA. STAr. tit. 37, § 537(A)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1986) (emphasis added). Furthermore, "per-
son" may include an individual. OKIA. STAT. tit. 37, § 506 (23) (Supp. 1986).
106. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 303; Defendants/Appellees' Response Brief at 8, Brigance v. Velvet
Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986) (No. 62,0005).
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owner must utilize defenses other than the traditional rule of non-liabil-
ity. The usual defenses to negligence liability include assumption of risk
and contributory or comparative negligence.'° 7
1. Assumption of Risk
If a plaintiff knowingly exposes himself to danger, he may be subject
to the affirmative defense of assumption of risk."0 8 An assumption of risk
defense requires a finding of two elements: (1) the plaintiff must know
risk is present and understand its nature, and (2) his choice to incur it
must be free and voluntary.0 9 The choice to ride in an automobile with
a drunk driver could arguably meet the assumption of risk requirements,
thus making the defense applicable to vendor liability.
The facts in Brigance suggest that an assumption of risk defense may
have been appropriate. The commercial vendor could have reasonably
argued that Brigance assumed the risk by riding in the car with an intoxi-
cated driver and that the plaintiff's conduct in encountering a known
risk should have been considered unreasonable. Defining taking risk as
unreasonable, however, suggests that the injured plaintiff may also be
accused of comparative negligence. Although a comparative negligence
defense may be more applicable to a suit brought by an injured con-
sumer,1° the unreasonable conduct factor inherent in an assumption of
risk defense indicates that both types of defenses should be asserted by
the vendor in a civil liability claim brought by an injured third party.
2. Comparative Negligence
If the injured consumer becomes a recognized plaintiff in Oklahoma
dram shop litigation, and is thus able to assert a civil liability claim
against a liquor vendor for damages incurred as a result of his intoxica-
tion, the liquor vendor should assert a comparative negligence defense to
the patron's claim."' The Brigance majority expressly declined to ad-
107. Tome v. Berea Pewter Mug, Inc., 4 Ohio App. 3d 98, 446 N.E.2d 848 (1982). The opinion
notes that in some claims of negligence per se, contributory negligence is not recognized as a defense;
however, contributory negligence may be invoked even where the defendant is found to have com-
mitted negligence per se. Id. For a discussion of negligence per se, see supra note 61.
108. Tome, 4 Ohio App. 3d at -, 446 N.E.2d at 853.
109. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 68 at 487 (5th ed. 1984).
110. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. Comparative negligence is more applicable to a
suit brought by the injured consumer because the vendor will want to assert that the patron was
negligent in driving an automobile while intoxicated. However, the defense may not be a valid one
to assert against a vendor liability claim. See infra note 115.
111. Oklahoma avoids the harshness of a strict contributory negligence doctrine by statutorily
recognizing a comparative negligence defense. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 13 (1981). Instead of com-
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dress the question of whether a consumer intoxicated driver has a new
cause of action against the commercial vendor for on the premises con-
sumption, hence the issue is conceivably open to either further litigation
or legislative response.' 12 Some jurisdictions hold that a contributory
negligence defense is unavailable to a tavern owner. Because the defense
completely bars any recovery by the plaintiff, the scope of vendor liability
would be meaningless if he could claim that it was the patron's own fault
for drinking too much.1 13 However, under Oklahoma's comparative neg-
ligence statute, the commercial vendor may have a more viable defense
under the appropriate circumstances.
If a vendor can successfully claim that the injured consumer plaintiff
was negligent in causing his own injuries, the vendor may have a valid
comparative negligence defense to a civil liability claim. However, be-
cause the Oklahoma statute providing the defense states that compara-
tive negligence may completely bar a plaintiff's recovery if the plaintiff's
negligence is of a greater degree than the defendant's negligence,' 14 the
liquor vendor should be aware that the Oklahoma courts may view this
defense as effectively undermining the cause of action created in Brigance
and thus invalidate the defense. 1 5 Paradoxically, therefore, it seems that
the vendor may be better off accepting partial responsibility for damages
in anticipation that a court may invalidate the defense to vendor liability
which will thus place full liability on the vendor if he attempts to show
that the plaintiff's negligence greatly outweighed his own.' 16 However,
pletely barring a negligent plaintiff's cause of action, the comparative negligence theory allows a
degree of negligence to attach to each party to illustrate their comparative fault. Id. A plaintiff may
therefore still recover a portion of his damages.
112. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 305 n.1 1. The concurring opinion states that traditional common law
rule of vendor non-liability with regard to the injured consumer as plaintiff is still intact. Brigance,
725 P.2d at 306. The statement may be some indication that this cause of action will be flatly denied
by the court in the future, but until that decision is made, the vendor should be aware of the compar-
ative negligence defense.
113. See Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, -, 667 P.2d 200, 205 (1983) (acknowledging that
one cannot become intoxicated if one does not drink; but that the obverse is equally true, that one
cannot become intoxicated by drinking liquor unless someone furnishes it).
114. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 13 (1981).
115. When the plaintiff's negligence is of a greater degree than the defendant's negligence, the
defense effectively changes from comparative negligence to contributory negligence and the defen-
dant will escape liability completely. However, because comparative negligence is a proximate cause
issue, a determination that the patron's negligence legally caused his own injuries would be an effec-
tive abrogation of the new rule of vendor liability set forth in Brigance.
116. However, the court may want to completely deny the defense to avoid inundating the
courts with lawsuits on the issue of the plaintiff's negligence. The defense could be used so effec-
tively that the Brigance rule would be undermined.
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as with asssumption of risk, comparative negligence is a jury question.' 17
If judicially considered to be a valid defense to dram shop litigation, the
tavern owner may still raise the defense in hopes that the jury will deter-
mine that the patron's cause of action should be completely negated or at
least determine that the plaintiff should only be allowed partial recovery.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., the Oklahoma Supreme
Court abrogated the traditional common law rule of commercial vendor
liability, holding that the vendor has a duty to exercise reasonable care
not to serve one noticeably intoxicated, who may lack the ability to safely
operate a motor vehicle and who may create an unreasonable risk of
harm to others. The tavern keeper's duty arises in light of foreseeable
circumstances and statutory mandate.
Commercial vendors must take steps to guard against liability by
educating their employees to exercise reasonable care in dealing with
their patrons. The Brigance standard is admittedly nebulous, but the tav-
ern keeper must take care to recognize a customer's intoxication and
comply with Oklahoma's liquor control statutes when dealing with intox-
icated persons and minors.
Finally, the commercial vendor should be aware of the possible de-
fenses to civil liability and realize that reliance on the traditional com-
mon law rule and a theory of exclusive legislative authority is no longer
wise in Oklahoma. The unresolved liability issues alert the liquor store
owner and the social host that they may be subject to liability for injuries
caused by one to whom they have furnished alcohol. The final effect of
Brigance, however, may be to urge the legislature to refine the civil liabil-
ity of the commercial vendor, liquor store owner, and social host.
Marilyn Mollet
117. The defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are questions of fact for
determination by the jury. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 12 (1981).
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